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CHAPTER 13 
Trusts and Estates 
DAVID W. FITTS' 
JANET SMITH FERBER**t 
§ 13.1. Will Compromise - Fee Agreement. During the Survey year in 
Richmond v. Wohlberg! the Supreme Judicial Court considered the bind-
ing effect of a will compromise agreement upon an administratrix with the 
will annexed who was appointed subsequent to that agreement. In resolv-
ing this issue, the Richmond Court examined the authority of an attorney 
acting as a fiduciary to retain his own law firm as counsel. 
In Richmond, the testatrix, Ronnie W. Brooker, died in December, 
1973 with an estate valued at $122,321.02. 2 Her will provided a $25,000 
bequest in trust for the benefit of three minor children of a deceased 
brother. 3 If the children died before final distribution, the trust property 
was to be distributed to the residuary legatee, if then living, or to her heirs 
at law. 4 The rest and residue of the estate was to be distributed to a friend 
of the testatrix. 5 Stephen Richmond, an attorney, was nominated 
executor and trustee and petitioned for appointment. 6 He was appointed 
special administrator. 7 
Two brothers of the testatrix who had not been named in the will 
objected to the will on the basis that their sister lacked testamentary 
capacity.8 During the will contest and the period of special administration, 
Richmond retained his law firm to represent him.9 The residuary legatee 
* DAVID w. FITTS is a partner in the Boston law firm of Haussermann, Davison & 
Shattuck. 
** JANET SMITH FERBER is an associate in the Boston law firm of Haussermann, 
Davison & Shattuck. 
t The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Susan M. Miller, Stephen 
Ziobrowski, and Lawrence B. Cohen, who have reviewed and briefed cases for this chapter. 
Attorneys Miller, Ziobrowski and Cohen are associates in the law firm of Haussermann, 
Davison & Shattuck. 
§ 13.1 1 385 Mass. 290, 431 N .E.2d 902 (1982). 
2 Id. at 291, 431 N.E.2d at 903. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6/d. 
7Id. 
SId. at 291, 431 N.E.2d at 903-04. 
9 Id. at 291, 431 N.E.2d at 904. 
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was also represented, but the minor trust beneficiaries were not, and no 
guardian ad litem was appointed. 10 During trial the parties agreed to settle 
their claims and entered into a compromise agreement, which in pertinent 
part provided for Janet Wohlberg's appointment as administratrix of the 
estate and trustee. I I In return, Richmond obtained an agreement concern-
ing counsel fees payable to his firm.12 The contestants agreed to pay 
Richmond's firm $28,000 plus disbursements without contest, and the 
agreement was memorialized in a letter written by Richmond's counsel. 13 
Although the fee agreement was not incorporated into the compromise 
agreement submitted to the Probate Court, it was reported to the probate 
judge when the the compromise was presented. 14 The judge approved the 
compromise and appointed Wohlberg as administratrix with the will an-
nexed. ls 
Richmond then filed his fourth and final accoUnt reflecting payment of 
legal fees and disbursements to his firm in the amount of $28,726.80. 16 
Wohlberg and a brother of the testatrix filed timely objections to the 
'. validity and effect of the fee agreement." 17 A guardian ad litem was 
appointed to represent the minor trust beneficiaries and he concluded that 
he would not "take any position relative to these objections, particularly 
as the rights of the beneficiaries of the trust have not been adversely 
affected." 18 A second probate judge concluded that the fee agreement 
was enforceable against Wohlberg based upon findings that the fee agree-
ment was "an integral part of the settlement" of the will cOl1test, th~t the 
parties had reported it to the first probate judge in conjunction with the 
presentation of the compromise, and that it "did not affect the ability of 
the estate to fund [the] trust." 19 A judgment was entered allowing 
Richmond's account and additional co~nsel fees and expenses incurred in 
the defense of his account. 20 
Wohlberg appealed the decision of the second probate judge, claiming 
that the arrangement between Richmond and his own law firm for legal 
services in his capacity as special administrator was improper and re-
sulted in an excessive charge against the estate for counsel fees. 21 In 
addition, Wohlberg argued that the compromise agreement was unen-
10 Id. 
II Id. at 292, 431 N.E.2d at 904. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
141d. 
IS /d. 
16/d. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 293, 431 N·.E.2d at 904. 
191d. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
2
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forceable as a matter of policy to the extent it authorized the payment of 
fees by Richmond. 22 Richmond contended that Wohlberg had no standing 
to attack the compromise agreement. 23 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected Richmond's claim that Wohlberg 
lacked standing to challenge the fee agreement and noted that Wohlberg 
should be able to question wh~ther the agreement is illegal or contrary to 
public policy. 24 As the person who must carry out the compromise 
agreement, the Court observed, Wohlberg has a considerable legal inter-
est in the agreement's validity.25 The Court continued, however, by 
observing that W ohlberg could not challenge the agreement's validity by 
raising third party claims such as those of the minor trust beneficiaries 
who were not represented in the compromise negotiations. 26 
Before considering the effect of the compromise agreement itself, the 
Court stated some general principles. 27 The Court reviewed the statutory 
method available to parties disputing the distribution of an estate,28 and 
concluded that Richmond complied with proper procedure in this case. 29 
The Court then restated the principle that a valid compromise is binding 
upon an executor or administrator and necessarily upon a subsequently 
appointed executor or administrator as well. 30 Accordingly, the Court 
considered the validity of the compromise agreement, including the ac-
companying fee agreement, to be the primary issue before itY 
The Court analyzed Wohlberg's claim that the fee agreement was 
unenforceable as a matter of policy based upon her contention that the 
arrangement between Richmond and his firm amounted to such a serious 
conflict of interest "that the agreement sanctioning it must be held 
void. "32 The Court rejected this reasoning and cited Chase v. Pevear33 for 
the proposition that it "is not per se improper for a lawyer acting as a 
special administrator to retain his law firm to perform legal services for 
the estate he represents.' '34 Furthermore, the Court stated, even if sucQ 
conduct involved a conflict of interest and a resulting breach of trost as 
claimed by Wohlberg, the agreement authorizing payment of such fees 
22 Id. at 294, 431 N.E.2d at 905. 
23 Id. at 295, 431 N.E.2d at 905. 
24 /d. at 295, 431 N .E.2d at 905·06. 
25 Id. at 295, 431 N.E.2d at 906. 
26 Id. 
27 /d. at 294, 431 N.E.2d at 905. 
28/d. at 294·295, 431 N.E.2d at 905. 
29 /d. at 296-97, 431 N.E.2d at 906·07. 
30 Id. at 295, 431 N.E.2d at 905. 
31 /d. 
32 Id. at 296, 431 N.E.2d at 906. 
33 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 905, 419 N.E.2d 1358. 
34 385 Mass. at 296, 431 N.E.2d at 906. 
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would not necessarily be invalid and unenforceable. 3s The Court ob-
served that such an agreement might be invalid only if there was not full 
disclosure or some other special circumstances not present in this case. 36 
The Court also rejected Wohlberg's argument that the compromise 
precluded judicial review of the fee arrangement. 37 The Court recognized 
that in situations where a fiduciary employs himself or his firm, there is a 
need for "careful scrutiny" of the fees. 38 The Court found that in this 
case, however, the need for review was satisfied.39 The first probate judge 
had been made aware of the fee agreement, the Court noted, and he had 
approved it.40 
Finally, the court rejected Wohlberg's claim that Richmond used coer-
cion and overreached in his insistence on the fee arrangement as a condi-
tion to his signing the will compromise agreement.41 Again, the Court 
emphasized Richmond's full disclosure ofthe fee to the probate court and 
the interested parties, and noted that Richmond did not use his position to 
gain approvals of matters which were not the subject of the negotiations 
such as prospective assent to his accounts.42 The Court also observed that 
it had been the contestants, and not Richmond, who had generated the 
need for the legal fees paid to Richmond's firm.43 
§ 13.2. Income Taxation of Estate and Trust Income. During the Survey 
year in Springall v. Commissioner of Revenue 1 the Appellate Tax Board 
decided that income received by a Massachusetts estate which was pay-
able to a Massachusetts trust for a non-resident beneficiary is subject to 
Massachusetts income tax under chapter 62, section 9 of the General 
Laws because the income was, in effect, held for a person who was a 
Massachusetts resident. 2 The Board characterized the pour-over trust as 
a "person" residing in Massachusetts.3 Noting that the underlying prop-
35 ld. at 297, 431 N.E.2d at 906. 
36 ld. at 297, 431 N.E.2d at 907. 
37 ld. 
38 !d. 
39 ld. at 297-98, 431 N .E.2d at 907. 
40 ld. 
41 !d. at 298, 431 N.E.2d at 907. 
42 !d. 
43 ld. The Court also upheld the probate court's award of counsel fees and expenses to 
Richmond for defense of his accounts. ld. at 299, 431 N.E.2d at 907-08 (citing Berkshire 
Trust Co. v. Booth, 317 Mass. 331, 335, 58 N.E.2d 161, 163 (1944». 
§ 13.2. 1 3 Mass. Supp. 804 (October 25, 1982). 
2 ld. at 807. 
3 ld. at 805 (citing G.L. c. 62, § 10 (e». One of the trustees was a Massachusetts resident 
and the trust was created by a Massachusetts resident who died a domiciliary of Massachu-
setts. Therefore, the trust was a Massachusetts trust, subject to the taxing jurisdiction of the 
Commonwealth. 
4
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erty which earned the income had never been actually transferred to the 
trustees, the Board refused to consider the "pass through" nature of the 
trust. 4 It relied upon the general principle of law that estates, trusts and 
beneficiaries all constitute separate and distinct legal entities to find that 
they are also separate taxable entities.s 
The appellants were the executors under the will of deceased Massa-
chusetts resident, Cyrus F. Springall. 6 The residue of the Springall estate 
poured over to the appellants as trustees of an inter vivos trust created by 
the decedent. 7 The estate received dividend and interest income of 
$7,513.89 in the calendar year 1976.8 This estate income subsequently was 
transferred to the trustees of the inter vivos trust and thereafter was 
transferred to the donor's wife, MaIjorie L. Springall, who was domiciled 
in Connecticut in 1976.9 In 1979, the Commissioner assessed an additional 
tax on this interest and dividend income, which with interest amounted to 
$882.93. 10 The appellants applied for an abatement. I I The Commissioner 
denied the abatement for the following reasons: 
l. The estate is a taxable entity subject to income taxation per Massachu-
setts General Laws, chapter 62, section 9. 
2. The residuary beneficiary of the estate is a Massachusetts inter vivos 
trust and as such is a separate taxable entity subject to income taxation 
under Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 62, section 10. 
3. Estate income is accumulated for or payable to a Massachusetts inter 
vivos trust and as such is fully taxable. 12 
The appellants appealed this denial to the Board. \3 
The Board agreed with the Commissioner that the trust was a Massa-
chusetts trust and, therefore, a Massachusetts resident for purposes of 
applying the tax statute. 14 General Laws, chapter 62, sections 9 and 10 in 
4 ld. at 806. See G. NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES § 86, at 18 (4th ed. 1958), which 
states in part: "[T]he title is in the executor or administrator and he must make a formal 
transfer before it can vest in an heir or legatee .... Where the executor is also trustee certain 
other formalities are required in order that the transfer to himself as trustee shall be 
complete." 
5 3 Mass. Supp. at 806. "This distinction between the individuality of the estate on one 
hand and an intervening trust on the other is recognized both by the Internal Revenue Code 
and Massachusetts law under chapter 62." ld. 
6 ld. at 804. 
7 ld. at 805. 
H Jd. at 804. 
9 Jd. at 804-805, 807. "The vagueness of [the written] stipulation leaves the Board in 
doubt as to what actually happened as between the executors and trustees concerning their 
practice of transferring property in these two capacities." ld. at 807. 
10 ld. at 804-05. 
11 Jd. at 805. 
12 Jd. at 805. 
13 /d. at 804. 
14 ld. at 805. 
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support of this conclusion. ls The executors argued, however, that the 
true basis for Massachusetts tax liability is the residence of the ultimate 
beneficiary under the trust and that, for income' tax purposes, the separate 
existences of the estate and trust should be ignored. 16 The Board rejected 
this contention and agreed with the Commissioner that the "essential and 
fundamental difference" between the decedent's estate and his inter vivos 
trust could not be ignored for income tax purposes. 17 The Board observed 
that the Supreme Judicial Court had stressed the separate existence of a 
trust and its grantor for taxation purposes in Dexter v. State Tax Commis-
sion. 18 The Board determined that the same approach should be followed 
as to the separate estate entity.19 It noted the vast administrative differ-
ences between estates and trusts and found it to be significant that the 
15 ld, at 805. Chapter 62, as amended, and applicable to this case, provides in part: 
Section 9. The income received by the estates of deceased residents shall be subject 
to all the taxes imposed by this chapter to the extent that the persons to whom such 
income is payable, or for whose benefit it is accumulated are residents of the 
Commonwealth .... 
Section /0. The income received by trustees or other fiduciaries shall be taxed in 
the following manner: 
(a) The income received by trustees or other fiduciaries !iescribed in subsection (c) of 
this section shall be subject to the taxes imposed by this chapter to the extent the 
persons to whom the same is payable, or for whose beoefit it is accumulated, are 
inhabitants of the Commonwealth; 
(c) The provision of subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall apply to guardians 
and conservators appointed by a Massachusetts court; trustees under the will of a 
person who died an inhabitant of th,e Commonwealth; and trustees under a trust 
created by a person or persons one of whom was an inhabitant of the Commonwealth 
at the time of the creation of the trust or at any time during the year for which the 
income is computed, or who died an inhabitant of the Commonwealth, anyone of 
which trustees or other fiduciaries is an inhabitant of the Commonwealth. 
16 3 Mass. Supp. at 806. "The appellants argue that the taxes assessed to the executor 
under chapter 62, section 9 are provided only as a matter of convenience." Id. 
17 ld. at 806. 
I·ld. at 806 (citing Dexter v. State Tax Commission, 350 Mass. 380, 215 N.E. 2d 94 
(1966». In Dexter the Court said: "Nevertheless, legal title to the trust property (and trust 
income before its distribution) is in the trustee and the transfer in trust is an event of 
significance until and unless the trust is revoked." 350 Mass. at 385, 215 N.E.2d at 98-99. 
The Dexter case involved a grantor/beneficiary who sought to disregard the separate exis-
tence of the trust and to take a trust deduction as a personal deduction because of the 
"economic realities of the situation." See 350 Mass. at 382, 215 N.E.2d at 96-97. 
19 3 Mass. Supp. at 806. "Significant periods of time might have passed before tide to the 
property was actually transferred to the trustees and under the executors' broad powers, 
many changes in the assets might have occurred." The Board indicated that part of its 
rationale was based on the fact that the Commissioner should not have to track dowo every 
receipt of fiduciaries to determine in whom it will eventually vest. Id. 
6
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underlying property which gave rise to the income in question was riot 
shown to have been transferred to the trustees during the pertinent time 
period. ~o The Board pointed out the importance of actual formal transfer 
by executors, administrators and trustees. 21 
The decision of the Board is currently on appeal to the Supreme Judicial 
• Court and due to the impact which this decision would have on fiduciary 
income tl:lxation, if upheld, the Massachusetts Bankers Association has 
filed an amicus curia brief supporting the executors of the Springall 
estate. The decision constitutes a significant change in the scheme of 
taxation of estates and trusts and in fact is contrary to the Regulations of 
the Department of Revenue which in principle state that the taxation of 
fiduciary income in Massachusetts is controlled by the status of the 
beneficiary or beneficiaries who ultimately will enjoy the income. 22 Mas-
sachusetts fiduciaries and their legal advisors should be alert for the 
Supreme Judicial Court's decision. 
§ 13.3. Update on the Prudent Fiduciary Rule. In the 1981 decision of 
Chase v. Pevear 1 the Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed the "prudent 
fiduciary rule"2 of trust investments which it originally announced in 
20 ld. at 806-07. 
21 ld. See supra note 18. 
22 See MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 830, § 9.02, Method of Taxation of Trust. These regu-
lations, in pertinent part, provide: 
(1) General. Although in Massachusetts the trust and not the beneficiary is the 
taxpayer, the actual tax liability is controlled by the status of the beneficiary. 
(2) Character of Beneficiaries. 
(a) Resident Beneficiaries. To the extent that trust income is payable to or 
accumulated for the benefit of resident beneficiaries, all income is taxable to the 
trust in Massachusetts. 
(b) Non-Resident Beneficiaries. Where trust income is payable to or accumulated 
for the benefit of non-resident beneficiaries, only the net income derived from 
professions, trades or businesses carried on in the Commonwealth is taxable to 
the trust. 
(i) Trust as Beneficiary. Where a trust subject to the taxing jurisdiction of 
Massachusetts has income payable to, or to be accumulated for another trust, the 
incidence of taxation is to be determined by the character of the beneficiaries of 
the latter trust. . . ." 
See also MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 830, § 9.04(1), Estates, which states: "The treatment of 
estates for Massachusetts income tax purposes is substantially the same as that of trusts set 
forth in [title 830, sections 9.01 through 9.03)." 
§ 13.3. 1 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 905, 419 N.E.2d 1358 (1981). 
2 The "prudent fiduciary rule," also known as the "prudent man rule" or the "prudent 
trustee rule," was originally enunciated in Harvard College v. Armory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 
446 (1830). See Connolly, Trusts and Estates, 1981 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 9.1., at 210-15. 
Although Amory involved a trustee, the rule in fact applies to all fiduciaries in their 
7
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Harvard College v. Amory. 3 During the Survey year the investment prin-
ciples set forth in' Chase were applied in two Probate Court decisions, 
providing further guidance and instruction to fiduciaries faced with the 
responsibility of acting in a prudent manner with respect to investment 
decisions. • 
The first decision, In Re New England Merchants National Bank of 
Boston,4 involved challenges by a guardian ad litem to the acquisition of 
two securities, the retention of seven securities and the timeliness of the 
sale of seven securities by a common trust fund managed by Bank of New 
England, N .A. The probate court ruled in favor of the trustee with respect 
to all objections raised. In doing so, the court applied several principles 
emphasized by the Chase court regarding prudent investment and paid 
particular attention to the investment decision making process which the 
trustee had established and to which the trustee had adhered in its invest-
ment decisions. 
The probate court focused initially on the application of the prudent 
fiduciary rule to trust investments. The court concluded as a matter oflaw 
that the rule is a standard which "avoids inflexibility of definite classifica-
tion of securities, disregards the optimism of the promotor and eschews 
the exuberance of the speculator. It holds fast to common sense and 
depends on practical experience. "S A trustee "must exercise prudence in 
making or retaining each investment and is chargeable with any loss by 
failing to do so." 6 
In the case before it, the court found that the trustee employed pru-
dence, care and common sense in its use of and adherence to lists of 
appropriate trust investments. The court referred to these lists as "careful 
investment decisions. For this reason and in view of more modem parlance, the rule is 
referred to here as the "prudent fiduciary rule." The prudent fiduciary rule was originally 
stated as follows: 
all that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall conduct himself 
faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence, 
discretion, and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but 
in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income 
as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested. 
26 Mass. (9 Pick.) at 461. 
3 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830). See Connolly, supra note 2, at § 9.1, for an in-depth 
discussion of the Chase decision and the prudent fiduciary rule. 
4 Suffolk Probate and Family Court No. 410,090 (Warner, J., November 23, 1982) 
[hereinafter cited as New England Merchants]. 
5 New England Merchants, supra note 4, at 21. This language originally appeared in 
Kimball v. Whitney, 233 Mass. 321, 331, 123 N.E. 665, 666 (1919), and is quoted in the 
Chase decision, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 917, 419 N.E.2d at 1365. 
6 New England Merchants, supra note 4, at 21 (quoting Chase v. Pevear, 1981 Mass Adv. 
Sh. 905,919,419 N.E.2d 1358, 1366). See also Creed v. McAleer, 275 Mass. 353, 362, 175 
N.E. 761, 764 (1931). 
8
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and comprehensive. "7 The trustee maintained two lists: 1) a "working 
list" which included only stocks which the trustee's Investment Policy 
Committee and the trustee's Trust Committee had judged to be appropri-
ate and attractive for purchase for its trust accounts; and 2) a "guidance 
list" which contained stocks judged to be sound but not as attractively 
priced for purchase as the stocks on the working list. The working list was 
further divided into categories designated "general use," which were 
appropriate for all equity portfolios, and "approval required," which 
were purchased only if appropriate for the particular trust fund. 8 The 
trustee's investment staff continually monitored the stocks on these lists 
and the Trust Committee reviewed each decision to add' or delete a stock 
from a list, to move a stock from one list to another, and to designate a 
stock as one recommended for sale. 9 
After carefully studying the circumstances of acquiring, retaining and 
selling each common stock to which the guardian ad litem objected, the 
probate court noted that of the various securities challenged by the 
guardian ad litem only two securities were recommended for sale during 
the accounting periods before the court and that each was sold promptly 
after the "sell" designation was applied. 10 With respect to one security, 
the sales took place on several different dates between nine and fourteen 
days following imposition of the "sell" designation. The sales occurred 
withing twelve days of such designation with respect to the other secu-
rity.11 The probate court did not specifically state that it considered such 
intervals reasonable, but such a finding is implicit in the court's deci-
sion. 12 
In addition, the probate court noted that each security whose retention 
was challenged was listed on either the working list or the guidance list 
during the accounting periods before the court.13 The two securities 
whose acquisition was challenged were both listed on the working list at 
the time of acquisition. 14 The probate court also reiterated a policy set 
forth in Chase that a fixed number of years is not required before a 
security is considered "seasoned" and therefore acceptable. IS 
7 New England Merchants, supra note 4, at 9. 
• ld. at 5-6. 
9 /d. at 7. 
10 ld. at 8. 
II ld. at 18-19. 
12 See the probate court's Conclusions of Law No.5 and No. 10. /d. at 21 and 22. 
13 ld. at 8. 
14 ld. One security was designated for general use by all equity portfolios while the other 
was designated "approval required" because it paid no dividend and therefore was not an 
appropriate investment in accounts which required current yield. ld. at 8. 
15 ld. at 12. See Chase v. Pevear, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 905, 922·924, 419 N.E.2d 1358, 
1368-69. 
9
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The trustee also established certain policies and strategies for its trust 
accounts. These policies included the decision for its common trust funds 
to increase holdings of liquid assets such as commercial paper, Treasury 
Bills and certificates of deposit to twenty or thirty percent of the common 
trust fund. The policy was instituted in order to be in a position to 
purchase more equitie~ when the recession of the early 1970's abated. 16 
The guardian ad litem challenged the sale of two securities whi~h were 
sold to establish the cash reserves in accordance with this policy. The 
probate court held that these sales resulted from the exercise of a good 
faith judgment in pursuance of the trustee's cash reserve goal and, there-
fore, that such sales were prudent.17 
The second decision, In Re State Street Bank and Trust Company, 18 
presented an analogous situation in which a guardian ad litem had chal-
lenged certain investments by the State Street Bank as trustee of its 
Equity Common Trust Fund. In its finding that the bank had acted 
properly with respect to the guardian's objections, the probate court 
carefully reviewed the inv~stment decision making process established by 
the bank and found that the bank had adhered to the process in managing 
the common trust fund. The court concluded that' 'the trustee in making 
investment decisions affecting the trust, w1:!.s required to act in good faith 
and in the exercise of sound discretion and was not required to guarantee 
the success of each of its investments or to sell stocks at their peak 
prices. "19 
These two probate court decisions reflect at least one judge's view of 
the factors which are relevant to the application of the prudent fiduciary 
rule in Massachusetts. They represent important authority for the prac-
titioner Who may be faced with the preparation of a case involving ques-
tions of prudent investments or with advising a Massachusetts fiduciary 
on the establishment of a satisfactory investment decision making pro-
cess. 
§ 13.4. Bequest to Spouse of Subscribing Witness. Under General Laws, 
chapter 191, section 2, a bequest to the spouse ofa necessary subscribing 
witness to a will is voip. During the Survey year in Dorfman v. Allen I the 
Supreme Judicial Court determined2 that section 23 is constitutional. The 
16 New England Merchants, supra note 4, at 8-9. 
17 /d. at 19. 
18 Suffolk Probate and family Court No. 463,343 (Warner, J., November 23, 1982). 
19 /d. at 44. 
§ 13.4. 1 386 Mass. 186,434 N.E.2d HH2 (1982). 
2 Because of a procedural deficiency in the reservation and report of the case from the 
Probate and Family Court, the Supreme Judicial Court only stated its views with respect to 
the two questions of law presented. See infra text accompanying note 14. 
3 The case involved G.L. c. 191, § 2, before its amendment by Acts of 1976, c. 515, § 5. 
10
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Court also decided that the voided bequest should pass under the will 
rather than by intestacy because the will provided for a gift over to the 
issue of the beneficiary whose bequest was voided. 
By a will executed March 24, 1965, and a codicil executed November 1, 
1976, the testator left the entire residue of his estate, if his wife did not 
survive him by thirty days, in equal shares to his daughters, Muriel and 
Iris, and their issue by right of representation. 4 The law in effect when the 
will and codicil were executed required three subscribing witnesses to a 
wilJ.5 Also, General Laws, chapter 191, section 2, as then in effect, 
provided that a beneficial devise or legacy to a subscribing witness or to 
the spouse of a subscribing witness was void unless there were three other 
subscribing witnesses who were not similarly benefitted under the will. 6 
Both the will and the codicil were subscribed to by three witnesses, but in 
both cases one of those witnesses was the husband of the testator's 
daughter Muriel.7 
The testator died December 28, 1976, and his wife did not survive him 
by thirty days.8 Because Muriel's husband was a necessary subscribing 
witness to both the will and the codicil, chapter 191, section 2 voided the 
residuary bequest to Muriel. 9 At the time of the testator's death, Muriel 
had two issue, both her children. lo 
A will dispute was commenced in the probate court. 11 The probate 
judge reported two questions of law to the Appeals Court, pursuant to 
General Laws, chapter 215, section 13. 12 The Supreme Judicial Court, 
4 386 Mass. at 137; 434 N.E.2d at 1013. 
S G.L. c. 191, § I, before its amendment by Acts of 1976, c. 515, § 3, required three 
subscribing witnesses to a will. The 1976 amendment, made effective with respect to 
decedents dying on or after January I, 1978, changed the number of required subscribing 
witnesses to a will from three to two. 
6 G.L. c. 191, § 2, before its amendment by Acts of 1976, c. 515, § 5, read: 
Any person of sufficient understanding shall be deemed to be a competent witness to 
a will, notwithstanding any common law disqualification for interest or otherwise; but 
a beneficial devise or legacy to a subscribing witness or to the husband or wife of such 
witness shall be void unless there are three other subscribing witnesses to the will 
who are not similarly benefitted thereunder. 
The 1976 amendment, made effective January I, 1978, substituted the number "two" for the 
number "three" in the second clause. 
7 386 Mass. at 137, 434 N .E.2d at 1013. 
" Jd. 
9 See Rosenbloom v. Kokofsky, 373 Mass. 778, 369 N.E.2d 1148 (1977). 
10 386 Mass. at 137,434 N.E.2d at 1013. 
II Jd. at 136, 434 N .E.2d at 1012. 
12 G.L. c. 215, § 13, as amended through Acts of 1975, c. 400, § 400, § 59, reads: 
Ajudge of the probate court by whom a case or matter is heard for final determination 
may reserve and report the evidence and all questions of law therein for consideration 
of the appeals court, and thereupon like proceedings shall be had as upon appeal. And 
if, upon making an interlocutory judgment, decree or order, he is of opinion that it so 
11
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after ordering direct review on its own initiative, ruled that the report to 
the Appeals Court was procedurally deficient because the probate court 
had made no judgment, decree or order and had not reported the entire 
case.13 For this reason the report had to be discharged, but because the 
parties had raised and briefed the issues before the Supreme Judicial 
Court, the Court stated its views. 14 
In response to the argument of Muriel and her children that chapter 191, 
section 2 violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the 
federal and state constitutions, the Supreme Judicial Court reasoned that 
because the statute does not implicate a suspect class or a fundamental 
interest, it is constitutional if rationally related to a permissible legislative 
objective. IS The Court found that the statute is reasonably related to two 
permissible objectives: 1) reducing the potential for perjury; and 2) pro-
tecting testators from overreaching by subscribing witnesses who, 
through their spouses, could benefit under the will. 16 
The second question was whether the voided bequest should pass by 
the will or by intestacy. The statute is silent as to where a voided bequest 
devolvesY The Court observed the general rule that a void residuary 
bequest to a legatee who is not a member of a donee class passes by the 
law of intestacy, 18 except where the testator has created a gift over. 19 
Here the testator had left the residue of his estate to his daughters Muriel 
and Iris "and their issue by right of representation," clearly creating a gift 
over to Muriel's issue if Muriel did not survive the testator. 20 The ques-
tion was whether the will demonstrated the testator's intention to create a 
affects the merits of the controversy that the matter ought, before further proceed-
ings, to be determined by the appeals court, he may report the question for that 
purpose, and stay all further proceedings except such as are necessary to preserve the 
rights of the parties. 
13 386 Mass. at 138, 434 N.E.2d at 1014. See Curran, petitioner, 314 Mass. 91, 94, 49 
N.E.2d 432,434 (1943): In the Matter of Jones, 379 Mass. 826,828 n.2, 401 N.E.2d 351, 354 
n.2 (1980). 
14 See In the Matter of Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 557 n.2, 432 N.E.2d 712, 716 n.2 (1982); See 
also In re Maldonado, 364 Mass. 359, 366, 304 N.E.2d 419, 424 (1973) (defective report 
under G.L. c. 231, § Ill). 
15 See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768-69, 776-77 (1975); Dandridge v. Williams, 
397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. I, 14 n.8, 271 N.E.2d 592, 601 n.8 
(197l); McQuade v. New York Cent. R.R., 320 Mass. 35, 38, 68 N.E.2d 185, 187 (1946). 
16 386 Mass. at 139, 434 N.E.2d at 1014. 
17 [d. at 139, 434 N.E.2d at 1014. 
18 See Derby v. Derby, 252 Mass. 176, 147 N.E. 842 (1925); Lyman v. Coolidge, 176 
Mass. 7,56 N.E. 831 (1900); Powers v. Codwise, 172 Mass. 425, 52 N.E. 525 (1899); Sohier 
v. Inches, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 385 (1859). 
19 See Gustafson v. Svenson, 373 Mass. 273, 366 N.E.2d 761 (1977); Leary v. Liberty 
Trust Co., 272 Mass. I, 171 N.E. 828 (1930). 
20 G.L. c. 190, § 8, defines "right of representation" to include nonsurvival. 
12
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1982 [1982], Art. 16
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1982/iss1/16
§ 13.5 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 427 
gift over to Muriel's issue if the gift to Muriel failed for another reason. 21 
The Court concluded that although the testator did not contemplate fail-
ure of the bequest to Muriel if she survived him, the language of the 
residuary bequest demonstrated the testator's intention that Muriel's 
issue should be substituted for Muriel if she should be unable to take her 
bequest. 22 In support of its decision, the Court noted that by attempting to 
dispose of all his property under the will and codicil, the testator had 
evidenced an intent to avoid intestacy and that the decision was consis-
tent with the principle that a construction of a will resulting in intestacy 
should be avoided unless plainly required. 23 
The Court in Dorfman v. Allen reached a sensible conclusion as to the 
proper devolution of a bequest under a will voided by chapter 191, section 
2 in the face oflegislative silence in the statute. As noted by the Court, the 
decision in Dorfman gives effect to the testator's intent to avoid intestacy 
while upholding the statute's policy of voiding bequests to interested 
witnesses to a will. 
§ 13.5. Apportionment of Estate Taxes - Fractional Share Gifts. In First 
National Bank of Boston v. Judge Baker Guidance Center,l the Massa-
chusetts Appeals Court examined the issue of estate tax apportionment 
when the testator's will is silent with respect to the estate taxes payable 
by each devisee and legatee of the decedent's estate. 2 In addition, the 
Appeals Court considered whether a gift phrased as "one-third (1/3) of 
the trust property held by ... [the trustee] on the day of the Donor's 
decease" is a fractional share gift thereby participating in fluctuations in 
the value of the trust property after the donor's death. 3 With respect to 
the estate tax apportionment issue, the Appeals Court concluded that 
General Laws, chapter 65A, section 5, as in effect in 1976 for decedents 
dying on or after January 1, 1976,4 requires qualified charities which are 
residuary legatees "to contribute to the payment of estate taxes owing on 
account of the pre-residuary and residuary taxable shares of the probate 
estate and trusts even though the share received by the charities is not 
subject to tax."s With respect to the second issue, the Appeals Court 
21 386 Mass. at 140, 434 N .E.2d at 1015. 
22 ld. 
23 See Lyman v. Sohier, 266 Mass. 4, 8, 164 N.E. 460, 462 (1929). 
§ 13.5. 1 13 Mass. App. Ct. 144,431 N.E.2d 243 (1982). 
2 Id. at ISO, 431 N.E.2d at 247. 
3 Jd. at 145,431 N.E.2d at 244. 
4 G.L. c. 65A, § 5 was amended by Acts of 1976, c. 415, § 88 and Acts of 1976, 
c. 515, § 1. These amendments, however, did not affect the issue involved in this case. 
s 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 145,431 N.E.2d at 244. 
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concluded that the phrase in question does constitute a fractional share 
gift which participates in fluctuations in value of the estate after the 
decedent's death. 6 
The decedent died on December 30, 1976. Her gross estate for estate 
tax purposes included the assets of two inter vivos trusts established by 
her and property over which she exercised a testamentary power of 
appointment. 7 The major portion of the decedent's probate estate passed 
by the residuary clause of her will. According to the terms of this clause, 
the decedent's second cousin received one-third of the residue and three 
charities shared equally in two-thirds of the residue.s 
One inter vivos trust provided that after certain specific legacies, the 
trust property passed one-third in trust for the decedent's adopted daugh-
ter, one-third to the decedent's second cousin and the remaining portion 
in equal shares to the same three charities. 9 The other inter vivos trust 
provided for certain specific legacies, including one in trust for the dece-
dent's adopted daughter, and directed distribution of one-third of the 
remaining trust property to the second cousin and two-thirds of the 
remaining trust property in equal shares to the three charities. lo 
The power of appointment which the decedent exercised had been 
created by a codicil to the will of the decedent's mother and applied to 
property held in trust for the benefit of the decedent for her lifetime. II The 
decedent exercised her general power of appointment and directed dispo-
sition of the trust property as a part of the residue of her estate. Thus, the 
decedent's second cousin shared in one-third of this property and the 
three charities shared equally in the remaining two-thirdsY 
A. ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT 
The decedent's will directed that "any inheritance and federal estate 
taxes due upon property passing under the provisions of this will ... shall 
be paid from the residue of my estate." 13 Each trust provided for estate 
tax payment by instructing that the trustee "shall pay that proportion of 
6 Jd. 
7 Jd. at 145, 431 N.E.2d at 244-45. 
8 /d. at 146, 431 N.E.2d at 245. 
9 /d. at 147,431 N.E.2d at 245. 
10 Jd. 
II Jd. at 145-146,431 N.E.2d at 245. For reasons not discussed in the Appeals Court's 
opinion, the parties entered into a stipulation receiving probate court approval that sixty 
percent of the property subject to the power of appointment was disposed of as if the 
decedent possessed a general power of appointment. /d. at 146, nA, 431 N .E.2d at 145 nA. 
This portion is the power of appointment property discussed in the Appeals Court opinion. 
12 Jd. at 146, 431 N.E.2d at 245. 
13 /d. at 147, 431 N .E.2d at 245-46. 
14
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any inheritance and federal estate taxes levied on the Donor's gross estate 
determined for federal estate tax purposes which the property passing 
under this indenture of trust bears to the total amount of the Donor's gross 
estate. "14 Because the decedent's will and both trusts provided that each 
was responsible for a pro rata share of the total estate tax, the issue before 
the Appeals Court was not the manner in which the total tax bill was to be 
apportioned among them. Rather, the issue was which of the beneficiaries 
under each instrument must bear the burden of that share of the total 
tax. IS 
The Appeals Court concluded that General Laws, chapter 65A, section 
5 requires the non-taxable charitable residuary shares of the probate 
estate and of the two inter vivos trusts to contribute to payment of the 
estate taxes due on account of the taxable pre-residuary and residuary 
shares of these portions ofthe decedent's estate. 16 In practical terms, this 
result means that' 'the residues of the probate estate and of the inter vivos 
trusts are to be charged with the payment of the taxes which must be 
calculated before the residue is divided." 17 In addition, the court found 
that the charitable and non-charitable beneficiaries of the residue of the 
probate estate were the recipients of the property subject to the dece-
dent's exercised power of appointment and, as such, each must bear apro 
rata share of the tax attributable to the power of appointment property. 18 
In reaching these conclusions, the Appeals Court agreed with the non-
charitable beneficiaries that chapter 65A, section 5 is a limited equitable 
apportionment statute. In other words, "it only apportions the burden of 
the total tax among the probate and non probate portions of an estate to 
avoid placing the entire tax obligation on the residue of the probate 
estate. "19 The Appeals Court rejected the contention of the charities in 
this case that section 5 provides for total equitable apportionment. The 
court would not interpret section 5 to require that assets which do not 
generate any estate tax do not bear any portion of the estate tax. 20 
The Appeals Court analyzed the language of section 5 and, in particu-
lar the effect of a 1948 amendment to the statuteY Prior to the 1948 
am'endment, the method of apportionment directed by the statute took 
into account exemptions and deductions from the estate tax. 22The 
amendment directs that the proportionate share of the total tax generated 
14 ld. at 147,431 N.E.2d at 246. 
15 /d. at 149-150,431 N.E.2d at 247. 
16 ld. at 155,431 N.E.2d at 250. 
17 /d. 
'" /d. at 154-55, 431 N .E.2d at 249-50. 
19 /d. at 150, 431 N.E.2d at 247. 
20 /d. at 150-51,431 N.E.2d at 247. 
21 Acts of 1948, c. 605, § I. 
22 i3 Mass. App. Ct. at 151,431 N.E.2d at 248. 
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by the probate estate shall' 'be charged to and paid from the general funds 
of the estate."23 The Appeals Court relied on the decision in Weingartner 
v. North Wales 24 to determine the effect of the 1948 amendment. The 
Weingartner Court found that after the 1948 amendment, "there is to be 
no statutory apportionment of the Federal estate tax on property passing 
by will. The executor is to make the payment, and is to make it from the 
residue." 25 The Appeals Court also looked to the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in YMCA v. Davis 26 for the proposition that a 
charity as the residuary beneficiary of an estate does not defeat the 
payment of estate taxes from the estate residue. 27 The Appeals Court 
found no public policy in Massachusetts which mandates otherwise.28 
The Appeals Court also contrasted section 5(3) with section 5(1) in 
connection with the decedent's probate estate29 and with section 5(2) in 
connection with the property passing by the inter vivos trusts30 and the 
exercise of the power of appointment. 31 With respect to property passing 
by the inter vivos trusts, the Appeals Court found that the language of 
section 5(2)32 treats the apportionment of taxes on trust property the 
sames as property passing by will. 33 In doing so, the Appeals Court noted 
that "[i]n today's estate planning, it is not reasonable to conclude that a 
will is always of greater significance than an instrument creating an inter 
vivos trust." 34 The apportionment of taxes with respect to the property 
passing by the exercised power of appointment is also governed by 
section 5(2).35 Section 5(3), in contrast to sections 5(1) and 5(2), ex-
pressly provides for equitable apportionment with respect to property 
passing otherwise than under a will or by virtue of an inter vivos trust or 
by the exercise or nonexercise of a power of appointment. Section 5(3) 
23 [d. at 151, 431 N.E.2d at 248. The present language in G.L. c. 65A, § 5(1) is the 
same as the language inserted by the 1948 amendment. 
24 327 Mass. 731, 101 N.E.2d 132 (1951). 
25 /d. at 734-35, 101 N.E.2d at 134, quoted in 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 151-52,431 N.E.2d at 
248. This was the common law in Massachusetts prior to enactment of the apportionment 
statute in 1943. See Weingartner v. North Wales. 327 Mass. 731, 734, 101 N.E.2d 132, 134 
(1951). 
26 264 U.S. 47 (1924). 
27 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 152, 431 N .E.2d at 248. 
2. /d. 
29 /d. at 151-52,431 N.E.2d at 248. 
30 ld. at 152-53, 431 N .E.2d at 248. 
31 ld. at 154,431 N.E.2d at 249. 
32 G.L. c. 65A, § 5(2) provides that the estate tax attributable to property passing 
by inter vivos trust shall be "charged to and paid from the corpus of the trust property." 
33 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 152,431 N.E.2d at 248. 
34 ld. (quoting First National Bank v. Shawmut Bank. 378 Mass. 137, 143, 389 N.E.2d 
1002, 1006 (1979». 
35 ld. at 154, 431 N .E.2d at 249. 
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further provides that any apportionment made under it shall be in accor-
dance with federal apportionment laws. 36 The Appeals Court relied on the 
specific reference to equitable apportionment in section 5(3) to conclude 
that the Massachusetts Legislature, by omitting such a reference, spe-
cifically intended not to provide for equitable apportionment in sections 
5(1) and 5(2).37 In addition, the Appeals Court noted that where the 
testator's instruments are silent, the federal estate tax has always been 
charged against the residue. 38 
In conclusion, the Appeals Court stated that it was not necessary to 
ascertain the decedent's intent regarding the apportionment of taxes 
among the beneficiaries of each portion of her estate. The silence in her 
instruments as to this factor did not "create an ambiguity or conflict of 
terms where none otherwise exists. "39 The Appeals Court, therefore, was 
not willing to presume that the decedent could not have intended the 
result reached by the court's decision, namely, an increase in the amount 
of the taxes on her estate.40 
In First National Bank the Appeals Court mentioned two practical 
pointers for estate planners. First, the court observed that the Massachu-
setts estate tax apportionment statute only applies where the testator's 
intruments are silent. 41 Thus, if statutory apportionment is not desired, 
the draftsperson can, and should, specifically direct the desired objective 
in the will and other instruments.42 Second, the Appeals Court noted that 
the problems created by a gift to charity as part of the residue such as the 
need for circular computations to determine the total estate tax, and the 
reduction, or even elimination, of the residue designated all or in part for 
charity where the residue bears the burden of estate taxes, may be 
avoided when charitable gifts are expressed as specific or general gifts in 
the instrument.43 The points made by the Appeals Court should remind 
practitioners to focus on the apportionment of estate taxes when drafting 
to avoid unintended results. 
36 G.L. c. 65A, § 5(3) provides in part that estate taxes not apportioned in accordance 
with sections 5(1) and 5(2) shall "be equitably apportioned among and charged to and paid 
by the recipients and beneficiaries of property or interests included in the measure of such 
tax and passing or arising otherwise than under the will of the decedent or by virtue of such 
trust [an inter vivos trust] or by the exercise or nonexercise of any such power of appoint-
ment in the proportion that the net amount of such property or interests bears to the amount 
of the net estate .... " 
37 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 153, 431 N.E.2d at 249. 
3M /d. 
39 Jd. at 153-54, 431 N .E.2d at 249. 
40 Jd. at 154,431 N.E.2d at 249. 
41 Jd. at 155, 431 N.E.2d at 249-50. 
42 Jd. at 15S, 431 N.E.2d at 250. The Appeals Court referred to 2 W. NOSSAMON & 
J. WYATT, TRUST ADMINISTRATION AND TAXATION § 39.13 (rev. 2d ed. 1980). Jd. 
43 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 154, 431 N.E.2d at 249. Again, the Appeals Court referred to 
W. NOSSAMON & J. WYATT, supra note 42, at § 39.13. 
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B. FRACTIONAL SHARE GIFTS 
One inter vivos trust, after providing for certain specific gifts, directed 
the trustee to "set aside one-third (1/3) of the trust property held by it on 
the day of the Donor's decease" in trust for the decedent's adopted 
daughter, to "distribute one-third (1/3) of the trust property held by it on 
the day of the Donor's decease" to the decedent's second cousin and to 
"distribute the rest, residue, and remainder of the trust property held by it 
on the day of the Donor's decease" to the three charities in equal 
shares.44 The decedent's adopted daughter focused on the language "on 
the day ofthe Donor's decease" in the description of her share to support 
her contention that her share must be valued as of the date of the 
decedent's death. She argued, therefore, that despite the downward fluc-
tuation in value of the entire trust property since the date of the dece-
dent's death, she is entitled to one-third of the value of the trust on that 
date. 45 The charities argued that the legacies to the decedent's adopted 
daughter and to the decedent's second cousin are fractional share gifts 
and therefore participate in fluctuations in value of the trust property 
occurring since the date of the decedent's death. 46 
The Appeals Court agreed with the charities on this issue and found that 
the phrase in question was not contrary to the decedent's intention, 
manifest from the instrument itself, to make fractional share gifts of the 
trust property.47 In support of its decision, the Appeals Court noted that if 
the phrase "on the day of the Donor's decease" was deemed determina-
tive, the residue as well as the gifts to the decedent's adopted daughter 
and second cousin would require valuation as ofthat date. If this were the 
case, no share would be affected by the fluctuations in the trust's value 
occurring since the date of death because the description of all shares 
used this phrase. In the words of the Appeals Court, this interpretation 
"produces an impossible result. "48 
§ 13.6. Undue Influence. In Erb v. Lee,l the Massachusetts Appeals 
Court upheld a probate court decree disallowing a petition for the probate 
of a will. The probate court judge found that the decedent testatrix was 
without testamentary capacity when the will was executed and that the 
will was not the free act of the decedent but the result of her house-
44 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 155-56,431 N.E.2d at 250 (emphasis added). 
45 /d. at 156, 431 N.E.2d at 250. 
46 Jd. 
41 Jd. 
48 Jd. at 157, 431 N.E.2d at 251. 
§ 13.6. I 13 Mass. App. Ct. 120,430 N.E.2d 869 (1982). 
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keeper's undue influence.2 The Appeals Court held that there was 
sufficient evidence to support the probate judge's finding of undue 
influence, but did not address the issue of testament~ry capacity.3 
In Erb, the grandson of Mary Buzzell, the decedent, opposed the 
allowance of the petition for the probate of the decedent's last will. The 
will provided that most of Buzzell's property would pass to her house-
keeper, Florence Bates, with the remainder passing to her chorch.4 Buz-
zell had hired Bates in late 1969 or early 1970 when the ,decedent was 
approximately eighty-five years old.s Buzzell was mentally alert at that 
time, but her physical condition was deteriorating and she required help to 
maintain her independence at home. 
As time went on, the relationship between Buzzell and Bates became 
strained. In the summer of 1973 Bates began to harass Buzzell for money, 
furniture and personal things. 6 In addition, Bates discussed with the 
rector of Buzzell's church a cash gift made by Buzzell and stated that the 
church should not have received the money. 7 Eventually Buzzell dis-
missed Bates and hired a replacement for her. After her dismissal, Bates 
made frightening phone calls to Buzzell at all hours of the day and night to 
harass her about money Bates claimed was due her. 8 
Approximately five months after her dismissal, Bates resumed her 
duties as Buzzell's housekeeper. 9 In August of 1974, Buzzell executed a 
new will which named Bates as its principal beneficiary. 10 At the time of 
execution, Buzzell was asked if Bates discussed the will with her and she 
answered, "No ... she [Bates] stated that she didn't want a cent from 
me."ll Her lawyer asked whether Bates had asked her to make this will, 
and she responded in the negative. 12 When asked if Bates had ever asked 
to be left any of her money in a will, the decedent replied, "No, she will 
be surprised by this. I think that this will surprise her very much. "13 
There was no indication after the will was executed that any trouble 
existed between Buzzell and Bates or between Buzzell and her grandson. 
Buzzell was admitted to a nursing home in the summer of 1975. She died 
on November 26, 1978. 14 
2 Id, at 120, 430 N ,E.2d at 870. 
3 Id. at 126, 430 N.E.2d at 872. 
4 Id. at 120, 430 N.E.2d at 870. 
sId. at 121,430 N.E.2d at 870. 
• Id. 
7 Id. 
8Id. 
9 Id. at 122, 430 N.E.2d at 870. 
10 Id. at 123, 430 N.E.2d at 871. 
IIId. 
121d. 
t3 ld. 
14Id. at 124,430 N.E.2d at 871.. 
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The Appeals Court held that the evidence presented and the permissible 
inferences therefrom supported the probate judge's finding of undue 
influence. Is The court noted that it could reverse ajudge's finding based 
on evidence only when it is plainly wrong, in other words, when the 
evidence, with every reasonable inference which can be drawn from it, is 
insufficient to warrant the findings. 16 The court reasoned that in determin-
ing whether the Buzzell was subject and susceptible to Bates's influence 
the judge could have considered Buzzell's weakened mental condition, 
especially in light of the intimate relationship that existed between Bates 
and BuzzellY The court pointed out that evidence of the mere opportu-
nity to exert undue influence over the decedent would not alone be 
sufficient, but whereas in the case before it there was other evidence 
presented, the finding of undue influence was warranted. The court cited 
as significant Bates' domineering personality and her harassing requests 
for money and property.I8 The court concluded that these events, fol-
lowed by the drastic change in the will after Bates brought herself back 
into Buzzell's employ, supported a finding that the will's execution was 
the result of Bates' undue influence over the decedent. 19 
15 ld. at 124, 430 N .E.2d at 872. 
16 ld. 
11 Id. 
18 Id. at 126, 430 N.E.2d at 872. 
19/d. 
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